

## **TRADE-OFFS WITH TOKEN SECURITY**

**DR. PHILIPPE DE RYCK** 

https://Pragmatic Web Security.com

eyJhbGci0iJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6Ik5UVkJPVFUzTXpCQk9FVXd0emhCUTBWR0

1rUTBRVVU1UVRZeFFVVXlPVU5FUVVVeE5qRXlNdyJ9.eyJpc3Mi0iJodHRwczovL3N0cy5yZXN0b2d
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gb2ZmbGluZV9hY2Nlc3MifQ.XzJ0XtTX0G0SbCFvp4yZGJzh7XhMm0mI2XxtjWdl0Dz\_siIu8h11elcr8LwX6-hL20Q0W0eStzBzmm1FM\_tS7MxuKkYx8QlTW0URPembVKZ0hNi8kN1j0pyc0uzve7Jib5vcxmkPwqpcVDFACgP85\_0NYe4zXHKxCA5\_8V0n05cRCDSkNMTFzGJCT9ipCcNX
aVGdksojYGqQzezjpzzzwrtPEkiyFLFtDPZAl0MleF3oFA0CBK0UKuNjJ\_cSBbUsaIwfvK0WH47AwF
rRn\_TxL4S1P3j3b1GgBm8tAqXysY84VZu0rSg3zrZj1PnoqPD4mb0Xds20xafCr9wR4WTQ

vSvhNDeQLqrzRbvA2eeYE2PthB1cBimS



### I am Dr. Philippe De Ryck



**Founder of Pragmatic Web Security** 



### **Google Developer Expert**



### Auth0 Ambassador



SecAppDev organizer

### I help developers with security



Academic-level security training



Hands-on in-depth online courses



Security advisory services



https://pragmaticwebsecurity.com

## THE TECHNICALITIES OF JSON WEB TOKENS



eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.ey J1c2VyIjoiZTcyZDFhMjZmNDBlNGU4Nzk5NjciL CJ0ZW5hbnQiOiJkOGNmM2ZhMzAxYTM0Yzk2ODUw MmE3MDUxYmZkYzBhOCIsImlhdCI6MTYyMDE5MjY 0NDkxNCwiZXhwIjoxNjIwMTk2MjQ0OTE0fQ.bnd YFgq1sHD-


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
The base64-encoded header and payload, along with the signature


> The signature is crucial to ensure the integrity of the header and payload


### Decoded Edit THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET

```
HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
PAYLOAD: DATA
    "user": "e72d1a26f40e4e879967",
    "tenant": "d8cf3fa301a34c968502a7051bfdc0a8",
    "iat": 1620192644914,
    "exp": 1620196244914
VERIFY SIGNATURE
HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
   SuperSecretHMACKey
  secret base64 encoded
```











## **HMACS CANNOT BE USED IN DISTRIBUTED SCENARIOS**



### HMAC generation and verification happens with the same secret. Any verifier can also generate arbitrary tokens.



### WEB APPLICATION SECURITY

## Meet JWT heartbreaker, a Burp extension that finds thousands weak secrets automatically




https://lab.wallarm.com/meet-jwt-heartbreaker-a-burp-extension-that-finds-thousands-weak-secrets-automatically/

### **Brute Forcing** HS256 is Possible: The Importance of **Using Strong Keys** in Signing JWTs

Cracking a JWT signed with weak keys is possible via brute force attacks. Learn how Auth0 protects against such attacks and alternative JWT signing methods provided.

March 23, 2017



oded

EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET


https://auth0.com/blog/brute-forcing-hs256-is-possible-the-importance-of-using-strong-keys-to-sign-jwts/


## AVOID HMACS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE



### HMACs with long-lived keys have fundamental weaknesses, so it's better to use public/private key signatures









### Which signature algorithm should you use?



### WHICH SIGNING ALGORITHM SHOULD YOU USE?

- In the rare case that HMACs suit your needs, the default HS256 is a solid choice
- For asymmetric signatures, the story is a bit more complicated
  - RS256 is most widely supported and used, and is still considered secure for signatures
    - In light of future-proofing implementations, the RSA crypto spec has deprecated RS256
      - *RS256* is actually JWT's shorthand for *RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5*
    - Instead, the spec recommends the use of RSASSA-PSS, known in the JWT world as PS256
      - PS256, PS384, and PS512 are well supported by common JWT libraries
  - An even better alternative to RSA are elliptic curve digital signatures (ECDSA)
    - JWT libraries support ES256, which is unfortunately easy to misuse
    - Instead, you should use of *EdDSA*, which has unfortunately little to no library support

### • TL;DR: Use HS256 for HMACs and PS256 for asymmetric signatures


## **USE JWTS SIGNED WITH A PRIVATE KEY**



### The generator of a JWT uses the private key, but the verifiers all use the public key. PS256 is a robust choice for the signature algorithm.



## Critical Vulnerabilities Affect JSON Web Token Libraries



https://threatpost.com/critical-vulnerabilities-affect-json-web-token-libraries/111943/

The Authentication API prevented the use of "alg: none" with a case sensitive filter. This means that simply capitalising any letter ("alg: nonE"), allowed tokens to be forged.

Ben Knight Senior Security Consultant



### JSON Web Token Validation Bypass in AuthO Authentication API

Ben discusses a JSON Web Token validation bypass issue disclosed to Auth0 in their Authentication API.

https://insomniasec.com/blog/auth0-jwt-validation-bypass

April 16, 2020

How Many Days Has It Been Sin × +

▷ C 🏠 🗍 👌 howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com

# It has been <u>176 days</u> since the last alg=none JWT vulnerability.

👓 🚺 🗉

The UK NHS COVID-19 contact tracing app for Android was accepting alg=none tokens in venue check-in QR codes. <u>Write-up here.</u>

Out of date? <u>@ me on Twitter</u> © 2021

https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/

### **JSON Web Token Attacker**

JOSEPH - JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption Pentesting Helper

This extension helps to test applications that use JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption, including JSON Web Tokens.

### Features

- · Recognition and marking
- JWS/JWE editors
- · (Semi-)Automated attacks
  - Bleichenbacher MMA
  - · Key Confusion (aka Algorithm Substitution)
  - Signature Exclusion
- Base64url en-/decoder
- · Easy extensibility of new attacks

Author Dennis Detering		
Version	1.0.2	
Rating	公公公公公	
Popularity		

```
Last updated 08 February 2019
```

You can install BApps directly within Burp, via the BApp Store feature in the Burp Extender tool. You can also download them from here, for offline installation into Burp.

https://portswigger.net/bappstore/82d6c60490b540369d6d5d01822bdf61


## ASSERT THE ALG CLAIM MAKES SENSE




The alg claim in the header indicates how the token is signed. Ensure the claim corresponds to an expected value (or hardcode the algorithm)



### Decoded EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET







## EXPLICIT TYPING FOR JWTS

- JWTs are just a data representation and can be used for different scenarios
  - Due to reserved claims, many JWTs contain similar values
  - It can become tricky to differentiate between JWTs from the same service
    - OAuth 2.0 access tokens and OIDC identity tokens are issued by the same server
    - While both tokens contain similar claims, they serve a completely different purpose
    - An attacker could gain API access by using an identity token, which should never happen
- JWT best practices recommend explicit JWT typing
  - Instead of the generic *JWT* type, applications should use a custom type
  - E.g., the recommendation for OAuth 2.0 access tokens is to use *at+jwt*
- Explicit typing is highly recommended for custom JWTs
  - Only accept JWTs with proper typing and reject everything else



## **USE EXPLICIT TYPING FOR JWTS**



### The typ claim in the header indicates the type of JWT token. Verify the type after having verified the signature to avoid token confusion.



```
HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE
  {
   "alg": "HS256",
   "typ": "JWT"
  }
PAYLOAD: DATA
  {
   "userid": "12",
   "name": "Philippe De Ryck",
   "admin": true,
   "exp": 1620196244914
VERIFY SIGNATURE
 HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   SuperSecretHMACKey
 ) secret base64 encoded
```



### JWTS ARE JUST A REPRESENTATION OF CLAIMS



JWTs support the secure representation of claims, nothing more. You are responsible for what you build with JWTs and how you handle them.




## **USING JWTS IN PRACTICE**






# JWTs play a crucial role in the OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect ecosystem













1	{		
2	"iss":	"test_client_jwt",	
3	"sub":	"test_client_jwt", •	— The ID of the authenticating client
4	"aud":	"https://sts2.restograde.com/auth/realms/Restograde",	<ul> <li>The identifier of the STS</li> </ul>
5	"iat":	1590316085, •	—— The generation time of the JWT
6	"exp":	1590316100, •	— The expiration time of the JWT
7	"jti":	"77bef630-361c-486b-bc68-763c6c1d8900" •	— A unique value to prevent replay
8	}		



The authentication request containing the JWT

- 1 **POST** /auth/realms/Restograde/protocol/openid-connect/token
- 2 Host: sts2.restograde.com
- 3
- grant\_type=client\_credentials •
  &client\_id=test\_client\_jwt •
  &client\_assertion\_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:client- •
  &client\_assertion-type:jwt-bearer
  &client\_assertion=eyJhbGci0iJSUz...ZuTnMNQ •
  The JWT signed by the client



## JWTS CAN BE USED FOR CLIENT AUTHENTICATION



### RFC 7523 defines how to use JWTs for key-based OAuth 2.0 client authentication (along with a custom grant based on JWTs).



- https://sts.restograde.com/authorize
- ?response\_type=code --Indicates the *authorization code flow*
- &client\_id=lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv The client requesting access 3
- &scope=read 4
- 5
- &state=s0wzojm2w8c23xzprkk6 6
- &code\_challenge=JhEN0Amnj7B...Wh5PxWitZYK1woWh5PxWitZY •--- The PKCE code challenge
- &code\_challenge\_method=S256 The PKCE hash function 8

This URL cannot ensure the integrity of the parameters, nor does it authenticate the client that initiated the flow

These shortcomings can result in advanced attacks, such as **Redirection URL rewriting or Mix-up attacks** 





# *JWT Secured Authorization Requests* (JAR) use JWTs to generate initialization URIs




An OAuth 2.0 initialization URI

- 1 https://sts.restograde.com/authorize
- 2 ?client\_id=lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv •----
- 3 &request=eyJhbGci0iJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Im9hdXRoLWF1dGh6LX
- 4 JlcStqd3QifQ.eyJpc3Mi0iJsWTVnMEJLQjdNb3c0eURsYjZyZEdQc0
- 5 8yaTFnN09zdiIsImF1ZCI6Imh0dHBz0i8vc3RzLnJlc3RvZ3JhZGUuY
- 7 a8JSiQtbP4IKzGXvHoJvPh-T40xgA9QZj9erIT2wEVBcieA00340zl2
- 8 Y5Z953bgpSb404NbFKXa\_lD4GTJ2LGF48IGjRQ

Indicates the client making the request

• The configuration of the flow





@PhilippeDeRyck

6

....

#### The encoded JWT request

eyJhbGciOiJQUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6Im9hdXRoLWF 1dGh6LXJlcStqd3QiLCJraWQiOiJoaGJHeGxibW RsSWpvaVNtaEZUIn0.eyJpc3MiOiJsWTVnMEJLQ jdNb3c0eURsYjZyZEdQc08yaTFnN09zdiIsImF1 ZCI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc3RzLnJlc3RvZ3JhZGUuY29 tIiwicmVzcG9uc2VfdHlwZSI6ImNvZGUiLCJjbG llbnRfaWQiOiJsWTVnMEJLQjdNb3c0eURsYjZyZ EdQc08yaTFnN09zdiIsInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6 Imh0dHBzOi8vYXBwLnJlc3RvZ3JhZGUuY29tL2N hbGxiYWNrIiwic2NvcGUiOiJyZWFkIiwic3RhdG UiOiJzMHd6b2ptMnc4YzIzeHpwcmtrNiIsImNvZ GVfY2hhbGxlbmdlIjoiSmhFTjBBbW5qN0LigKZX aDVQeFdpdFpZSzF3b1doNVB4V2l0WlkiLCJjb2R lX2NoYWxsZW5nZV9tZXRob2QiOiJTMjU2In0.LJ pskbj0rYhwxt4Bwiiw1Ku-

nmhGuOFUvqBrv7xLFu6Tkkes6p9c7xvyulp017Q
ptCZlN5i7wQyXp5VY32fZ0dF9akGEhQymPSvyBe
wzZgDrE0M8ZD\_-

LbQhlg20wE3ekq4mwIsYVZVRA4RQJMmN9JuoQHU cuBRDke\_bdR1K6XosHQuy-


wEz7j8yix8vcqGgSe6MvPN3nZjShMAcTd9QJpZX qin5NqXlByFj9iRecByg0K6snJwz7S2s79R6987 1Tz8Ap\_vCcVtJRLinBCzyjS0JHEBMvrvu0xzxCH 4comCM96fyi47D5yRZFsUJmfIDJr1D4y0IVbQIu 2GKA\_bULw

```
1 {
2 "alg": "PS256",
3 "typ": "oauth-authz-req+jwt",
4 "kid": "hhbGxlbmdlIjoiSmhFT"
5 }
```

The payload of the decoded JWT object

```
1
    {
      "iss": "lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv",
 2
      "aud": "https://sts.restograde.com",
 3
      "response type": "code",
 4
 5
      "client_id": "lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv",
      "redirect uri": "https://app.restograde.com/callback",
6
 7
      "scope": "read",
      "state": "s0wzojm2w8c23xzprkk6",
8
 9
      "code challenge": "JhEN0Amnj ... xWitZYK1woWh5PxWitZY",
      "code challenge method": "S256"
10
11 }
```

The header of the decoded JWT object



## JWT SECURED AUTHORIZATION REQUEST (JAR)

- JAR allows the client to provide the flow configuration as a JWT
  - Contrary to plain URL parameters, the JWT is signed by the client
    - A signed JWT provides both data integrity and authenticity
  - If preferred, the client can also encrypt the request JWT for confidentiality
- The JWT signing key of the client must be registered with the STS
  - For confidential clients, this happens during client registration
  - For native public clients, this can be done with *dynamic client registration*
  - Web-based public clients do not benefit from JAR, since they already run in the browser
- The JAR specification is currently a draft, with limited implementation support
  - JAR is considered extremely useful and will become widely supported when finalized

### JWTS CAN BE USED FOR PARAMETER INTEGRITY




#### The upcoming JAR specification defines how to use JWTs to guarantee the integrity of URL parameters in redirect-based mechanisms.






#### What about token-based authentication?






## MANAGING THE TOKEN LIFECYCLE
































## Stop using JWT for sessions

13 Jun 2016


**Update - June 19, 2016:** A lot of people have been suggesting the same "solutions" to the problems below, but none of them are practical. I've <u>published a new post</u> with a slightly sarcastic flowchart - please have a look at it before suggesting a solution.

This article does *not* argue that you should *never* use JWT - just that it isn't suitable as a session mechanism, and that it is dangerous to use it like that. Valid usecases *do* exist for them, in other areas.

#### Stop using JWT for sessions, part 2

A handy dandy (and slightly sarcastic) flow chart about why your "solution" doesn't work

I think I can make JWT work for sessions by...



### **JWT**S ARE JUST A WAY TO REPRESENT CLAIMS




JWTs are not a session mechanism and should not be used as one. Using JWTs as authorization tokens requires a supporting ecossytem.





## OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens are crucial to improve the properties of access tokens





Buffer

Connected April 1, 2021, 9:45 AM (GMT)


Close

### **JWT** ACCESS TOKENS ARE SELF-CONTAINED




JWT access tokens are also known as self-contained access tokens. They can be independently verified by APIs using the public key of the STS.











# Reference tokens sound awesome, let's GOOOOOO!





#### How fast can you revoke an access token?



#### PRACTICAL GUIDELINES ON ACCESS TOKEN TYPES

- How short can you make your access token's lifetime?
  - Short lifetimes reduce the window of abuse and force the client to contact the STS
  - Frontend applications are more sensitive, so should have shorter token lifetimes
    - 5 10 minutes is quite common
- How important is revocation for your application?
  - If a small potential window of abuse is acceptible, short token lifetimes are a good option
  - If no abuse is acceptible, reference tokens offer the most control
- Revocation sounds great on paper, but can you implement it?
  - *Manual* revocation processes will be ineffective with token lifetimes of 5 10 minutes
  - Automatic revocation with anomaly-detection systems would be effective

#### ACCESS TOKEN TYPES

- The STS decides on the security properties of access tokens
  - Clients only send access tokens, so they are agnostic of the token type and its properties
  - The API will need to understand how to process different token types
- In practice, self-contained JWT tokens are common for distributed scenarios
  - Running token introspection between different parties is often difficult
  - Keep token lifetimes as short as possible
- Reference tokens are often used for internal systems
  - *On-premise* token introspection is easier to implement
  - Can also be implemented with an API gateway that translates tokens



#### LOOK AT THE FULL PICTURE OF A TOKEN LIFECYCLE




#### Token security is often a trade-off between performance and security. Short-lived self-contained access tokens typically offer a good balance




#### **ADVANCED TOKEN SECURITY**









- 1 https://sts.restograde.com/authorize
- 2 ?response\_type=code
- 3 &client\_id=lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv
- 4 &scope=read:restaurants write:reviews
- 5 &resource=https://api.restograde.com/reviews
- 6 &resource=https://api.restograde.com/restaurants
- 7 &redirect\_uri=https://app.restograde.com/callback
- 8 & [... state / code\_challenge / code\_challenge\_method ...]

The identifiers of the requested resource servers (APIs)

#### Requesting access tokens with a specific resource

- 1 POST /oauth/token
- 2 Host: sts.restograde.com
- 3
- 4 grant\_type=authorization\_code
- 5 &client\_id=lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv
- 6 &code=Splxl0BeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
- 7 &resource=https://api.restograde.com/reviews •
- 8 & [... redirect\_uri / code\_verifier ...]

Requesting an access token for a specific resource server (API)

#### 1 {

2	<pre>"iss": "https://sts.restograde.com",</pre>	
3	<pre>"aud": "https://api.restograde.com/reviews", •</pre>	A specific target audience
4	"sub": "2262430d-c9cb-484f-9770-805893ff9518",	
5	"scope": "reviews:write" •	The STS does "downscoping" by only
6	}	including relevant scopes for the audience

#### Requesting access tokens with a specific resource

- 1 POST /oauth/token
- 2 Host: sts.restograde.com
- 3
- 4 grant\_type=authorization\_code
- 5 &client\_id=lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv
- 6 &code=Splxl0BeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
- 7 &resource=https://api.restograde.com/reviews •
- 8 & [... redirect\_uri / code\_verifier ...]

Requesting an access token for a specific resource server (API)

#### USING RESOURCE INDICATORS

- A client can use the *resource* parameter to indicate the target audience
  - The client requests a set of resources when initializing the Authorization Code flow
  - The exchange of an authorization code/refresh token is done with a specific resource
- Resource indicators are URIs which are defined by the STS
  - It is recommended to use the full URL of an API to identify a resource
    - E.g., https://api.restograde.com, https://api.restograde.com/reviews
  - When not possible, the use of URNs allows for a more flexible naming scheme
    - E.g., urn:restograde:reviews
- The resulting access token will be tailored towards the requested resource
  - The audience will contain the resource indicator (*aud* claim in a JWT)
  - The scopes will typically be limited to relevant scopes for the audience (downscoping)

#### **RESOURCE INDICATORS SUPPORT LIMITING AUDIENCES**




This new OAuth 2.0 specification (RFC 8707) allows clients to request permission to access multiple APIs, but only request access tokens for a single API



# Sender-constrained tokens can be used to link access/refresh tokens to a specific client



### PROOF-OF-POSSESSION THROUGH TLS CERTIFICATES











### SENDER-CONSTRAINED TOKENS WITH MTLS


A JWT access token with an embedded certificate fingerprint

```
1
    {
 2
     "sub": "b6rdGPs02iBKB7s02i",
 3
      "aud": "https://api.example.com",
      "azp": "lY5g0BKB7Mow4yDlb6rdGPs02i1g70sv",
 4
 5
     "iss": "https://sts.restograde.com/",
      "exp": 1419356238,
 6
 7
     "iat": 1419350238,
 8
      "scope": "read write",
      "cnf": {
 9
        "x5t#S256": "bwcK0esc3ACC3DB2Y5_lESsXE8o9ltc05089jdN-dg2" - The fingerprint of the cert
10
11
      }
12
   }
```

### SENDER-CONSTRAINED TOKENS WITH MTLS

- The *cnf* claim contains information about the proof-of-possession key
  - JWT access tokens directly embed the *cnf* claim in the token
  - For reference access tokens, the STS provides the *cnf* claim during introspection
- The only responsibility for a client is using mTLS with a client certificate
  - An STS that supports sender constrained access tokens will use the certificate fingerprint
    - The hash in the *x5t#S256* value uniquely identifies the certificate and its public key
  - An API enforcing proof-of-possession will look for the *cnf* claim can verify the fingerprint
    - If the connection is setup with the right certificate, the client must possess the private key
- Sender constrained access tokens are much harder to abuse
  - An attacker would need to completely compromise a client to abuse access tokens

### THE CONCEPT OF DPOP









### DEMONSTRATION OF PROOF-OF-POSSESSION (DPOP)

- DPoP is an application-layer PoP mechanism relying on JWTs
  - The client generates a private/public key pair and proves possession of the private key
  - The STS links access tokens / refresh tokens to the public key of the client
  - The client provides a signed JWT along with any request carrying a DPoP token
- Possession of the private key is done through a DPoP proof JWT
  - The JWT has type *dpop+jwt* and contains metadata about the request being sent
  - The metadata includes the HTTP method and HTTP endpoint that the request is going to
  - Further details (request headers, request body, ...) are not included in the DPoP proof
- With DPoP, access tokens and refresh tokens become sender-constrained
  - They no longer act as bearer tokens, making it significantly harder to abuse stolen tokens

### **USE SENDER-CONSTRAINED TOKENS**



# The use of sender-constrained tokens is considered a best practice for sensitive OAuth 2.0 clients (both backend and native)



### **PASETO** AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO JWT



### PLATFORM-AGNOSTIC SECURITY TOKENS (PASETO)

- PASETO is explicitly developed to counter vulnerabilities in the JWT spec
  - The use of the *none* algorithm
  - The potential confusion between HMACs and digital signatures
  - The pitfalls with handling encrypted JWTs
  - The wide range of supported signing and encryption algorithms

### • The goal of PASETO is to offer a secure-by-design standard to represent tokens

- Versioned tokens instead of *algorithm agility*
- Fixed algorithm selection for each version to avoid confusion
- Specification of the purpose of a token (local use or distributed use)



v2.local.sIgVm0es9uswZliPdyX00i99czPbpl41K0Uu45e62BvCaL5H3kHNibrbRZkM1-wW091ARzNexLY8g0GZA0-WCNsgs8GZLClEk5TJbgQjf\_\_yExZRh2qMnqxfVr\_KS9WoqKVlU-WrAG6TRUXZo430SJQkeNBnB8Gq4rN2A8HYeA3ms20up80dgz2rpY79F9ILvPrAIzxNkDSE51vAxv50BTShuel3F3hXgReHsDv2PJCn MBnMyE\_AfePxJ6WJ1obXSIUpSs0QX6wjwdQd0IcXZ853c-NPYMVU-abXJhhLVvvHyNZPi1wcEvjt.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ

A public PASETO token (corresponds to a JWT signed with a private key)

v2.public.eyJpZCI6ICI0MTBkZjI5Ni040WQ1LTQz0DAt0DQyMy02ZjJkNzMwNDA3NDQiLCAibmFtZSI6ICJSYW5kYWxsIERlZ2dl cyIsICJleHAi0iAiMjAx0S0xMC0xMFQxMTowMzoyNC0wNzowMCJ9xe6hZBYn8IZoJmgL9k1VjTcl7Dz4Tlo2FvIxeFXQNtNY3QAyCaa5XW-29n-9nV-beU6z7P-YF97lPFvnPfnDA.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ



#### A local PASETO token (corresponds to an HMAC-signed JWT)

v2.local.sIgVm0es9uswZliPdyX00i99czPbpl41K0Uu45e62BvCaL5H3kHNibrbRZkM1-wW091ARzNexLY8g0GZA0-WCNsgs8GZLClEk5TJbgQjf\_\_yExZRh2qMnqxfVr\_KS9WoqKVlUwrAG6TRUXZo430SJQkeNBnB8Gq4rN2A8HYeA3ms20up80dgz2rpY79F9ILvPrAIzxNkDSE51vAxv50BTShuel3F3hXgReHsDv2PJCn MBnMyE\_AfePxJ6WJ1obXSIUpSs0QX6wjwdQd0IcXZ853c-NPYMVU-abXJhhLVvvHyNZPi1wcEvjt.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ

The version indicates how the token is structured and which algorithm is used (currently v2)

A public PASETO token (corresponds to a JWT signed with a private key)

v2.public.eyJpZCI6ICI0MTBkZjI5Ni040WQ1LTQz0DAt0DQyMy02ZjJkNzMwNDA3NDQiLCAibmFtZSI6ICJSYW5kYWxsIERlZ2dl cyIsICJleHAi0iAiMjAx0S0xMC0xMFQxMTowMzoyNC0wNzowMCJ9xe6hZBYn8IZoJmgL9k1VjTcl7Dz4T– lo2FvIxeFXQNtNY3QAyCaa5XW-29n-9nV-beU6z7P-YF97lPFvnPfnDA.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ



v2.local.sIgVm0es9uswZliPdyX00i99czPbpl41K0Uu45e62BvCaL5H3kHNibrbRZkM1-wW091ARzNexLY8g0GZA0-WCNsgs8GZLClEk5TJbgQjf\_\_yExZRh2qMnqxfVr\_KS9WoqKVlU-WrAG61RUXZo430SJQkeNBnB8Gq4rN2A8HYeA3ms20up80dgz2rpY79F9ILvPrAIzxNkDSE51vAxv50BTShuel3F3hXgReHsDv2PJCn MBnMyE\_AfePxJ6WJ1obXSIUpSs0QX6wjwdQd0IcXZ853c-NPYMVU-abXJhhLVvvHyNZPi1wcEvjt.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ

The purpose indicates how the token is secured (HMAC vs digital signature) and makes explicit how the token should be used

A public PASETO token (corresponds to a JWT signed with a private key)

v2.public.eyJpZCI6ICI0MTBkZjI5Ni040WQ1LTQz0DAt0DQyMy02ZjJkNzMwNDA3NDQiLCAibmFtZSI6ICJSYW5kYWxsIERlZ2dl cyIsICJleHAi0iAiMjAx0S0xMC0xMFQxMTowMzoyNC0wNzowMCJ9xe6hZBYn8IZoJmgL9k1VjTcl7Dz4Tlo2FvIxeFXQNtNY3QAyCaa5XW-29n-9nV-beU6z7P-YF97lPFvnPfnDA.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ



v2.local.sIgVm0es9uswZliPdyX00i99czPbpl41K0Uu45e62BvCaL5H3kHNibrbRZkM1-wW091ARzNexLY8g0GZA0-WCNsgs8GZLClEk5TJbgQjf\_\_yExZRh2qMnqxfVr\_KS9WoqKVlU-WrAG6TRUXZo430SJQkeNBnB8Gq4rN2A8HYeA3ms20up80dgz2rpY79F9ILvPrAIzxNkDSE51vAxv50BTShuel3F3hXgReHsDv2PJCn MBnMyE\_AfePxJ6WJ1obXSIUpSs0QX6wjwdQd0IcXZ853c-NPYMVU-abXJhhLVvvHyNZPi1wcEvjt.eyJraWQi0iAiMTIzNDUifQ

> V2 local tokens provide data integrity and data confidentiality for the payload (using authenticated encryption)

A public PASETO token (corresponds to a JWT signed with a private key)



@PhilippeDeRyck

### PASETO PROS AND CONS

**Robust and unambiguous algorithms** 

Purpose of tokens is easier to understand

No specific payload format (e.g., JSON)

No official specification, just an expired draft

No guidance on explicit typing for tokens

No support for encrypting public tokens

Library devs are still responsible for security



### **PASETO** ADDRESSES **JWT** INSECURITIES



### PASETO is simpler and less ambiguous than the JWT specifications, but the lack of use/support makes it less suited than JWTs



## FIXING JWTS IN YOUR ARCHITECTURE



Avoid HMACs and hardcode one digital signature algorithm



Use explicit typing to indicate the purpose of a token



Write a wrapper library to encapsulate the dirty details



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
Request for Comments: 8725
BCP: 225
Updates: 7519
Category: Best Current Practice
ISSN: 2070-1721

Y. Sheffer Intuit D. Hardt

M. Jones Microsoft February 2020

#### **JSON Web Token Best Current Practices**

Abstract

JSON Web Tokens, also known as JWTs, are URL-safe JSON-based security tokens that contain a set of claims that can be signed and/or encrypted. JWTs are being widely used and deployed as a simple security token format in numerous protocols and applications, both in the area of digital identity and in other application areas. This Best Current Practices document updates <u>RFC 7519</u> to provide actionable guidance leading to secure implementation and deployment of JWTs.

### CONCLUSION



### **Key takeaways**



Follow current best practices for handling JWTs (or use PASETO)



Remember that JWTs/PASETOs only represent claims, nothing else



Carefully analyze token security requirements in your architecture




### This online course helps you understand the details of OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect



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